Научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ, Nadya Malenko (Boston College)
В четверг, 21 декабря в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка, 26) прошел научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ по финансам.
Докладчик: Nadya Malenko (Boston College)
Тема доклада: "Proxy advisory firms: The economics of selling information to voters" совместно с Andrey Malenko
Докладчик: Nadya Malenko (Boston College)
Тема доклада: "Proxy advisory firms: The economics of selling information to voters" совместно с Andrey Malenko
Тезисы доклада: We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision-making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor's presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.
Предстоящие и прошедшие семинары МИЭФ
Дата
21 декабря, 2017 г.
Рубрики
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