We use cookies in order to improve the quality and usability of the HSE website. More information about the use of cookies is available here, and the regulations on processing personal data can be found here. By continuing to use the site, you hereby confirm that you have been informed of the use of cookies by the HSE website and agree with our rules for processing personal data. You may disable cookies in your browser settings.

International College of Economics and Finance

ICEF/LFE Research Seminar by Nadya Malenko (Boston College)

On Thursday, December 21 at 4.40 pm, room 3211 (Shabolovka str. 26) ICEF held the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Nadya Malenko (Boston College)
Theme: "Proxy advisory firms: The economics of selling information to voters" joint with Andrey Malenko

Abstract: We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision-making. If the quality of the advisor's information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor's information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor's presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors' market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.

 


Forthcoming and past seminars


 

Have you spotted a typo?
Highlight it, click Ctrl+Enter and send us a message. Thank you for your help!