• A
  • A
  • A
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • АБB
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
  • А
Обычная версия сайта
Контакты

119049 Москва, ул. Шаболовка, дом 26, корпус 3

Тел./факс: (+7495) 580-89-19, (+7495) 772-95-90 *26124

E-mail: icef@hse.ru

Дополнительные контакты

Руководство

Директор Яковлев Сергей Михайлович

заместитель директора по академическим вопросам Замков Олег Олегович

Заместитель директора по по науке Никитин Максим Игоревич

Публикация Сергея Степанова в Journal of Banking and Finance

Поздравляем Сергея Степанова, доцента МИЭФ, с принятием к публикации в международном реферируемом журнале Journal of Banking and Finance статьи "Firm Value in Crisis: Effects of Firm-Level Transparency and Country-Level Institutions"

Поздравляем Сергея Степанова, доцента МИЭФ, с принятием к публикации в международном реферируемом журнале Journal of Banking and Finance статьи "Firm Value in Crisis: Effects of Firm-Level Transparency and Country-Level Institutions". Статья написана в соавторстве с Рубеном Ениколоповым (Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, РЭШ) и Марией Петровой (РЭШ, Institute for Political Economy and Governance, Universitat Pompeu Fabra).

Аннотация:    
Recent empirical research suggests that country-level and firm-level governance institutions are substitutes with respect to their effect on firm value. In this paper we demonstrate that during a crisis these institutions may actually become complements. Specifically, we find that the decline in companies' valuation during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was more sensitive to firm-level transparency in countries with stronger investor protection. We propose a theoretical model that reconciles our findings with the results in the literature. In our model, during "normal times" strong firm-level governance is crucial to attract outside financing in countries with weak investor protection, but is less important in countries with good investor protection. During a crisis, however, investment opportunities decline even in countries with strong investor protection, and, as a result, relative importance of firm-level governance increases in such places.