ICEF Research Seminar by Shruti Sinha (TSE)
Speaker: Shruti Sinha (TSE)Theme: "Identification and Estimation in Many-to-One Two-Sided Matching without Transfers" joint with Yinghua He
Abstract: This paper considers a decentralized market with one-to-many matching and non transferable utilities, for example, college admissions. In such a setting the true preferences of both, the students and the colleges, are unknown to the econometrician. In this paper we study various conditions under which we can recover preferences from both sides of the market. The key methodological challenge is identification of preferences in the presence of endogenous consideration, called feasible sets here, sets for the students. We show identification of preferences on both sides of the market in semiparametric and nonparametric settings.
Our identification arguments are constructive suggesting estimators for simulations and our empirical application to the primary school admissions in Chile (work-inprogress).