Научный семинар МИЭФ, Balazs Szentes (LSE)

В четверг, 13 сентября в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка, 26) прошел научный семинар МИЭФ. 
Докладчик: Balazs Szentes (LSE)
Тема доклада: "Optimal Monitoring Design" joint with George Georgiadis.

Тезисы доклада: This paper considers a Principal–Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information-acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for the frequently observed single-bonus wage contracts. . 

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Семинары МИЭФ