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Руководство

Директор Яковлев Сергей Михайлович

заместитель директора по академическим вопросам Замков Олег Олегович

Заместитель директора по по науке Никитин Максим Игоревич

Job Market семинар МИЭФ, Steven Kivinen (Queen's University)

В понедельник, 5 февраля в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка, 26) прошел Job Market семинар МИЭФ.
Докладчик: Steven Kivinen (Queen's University)
Тема доклада: "Robust Group Strategy-Proofness" совместно с Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Тезисы доклада: Many economic situations involve the allocation of goods and services relying (implicitly or explicitly) on reported preferences. Examples include the assignment of organs to patients, medical residents to hospitals, students to dorm rooms, items to bidders in an auction, work on a project to workers, and many more. A desirable property of the allocation rules that govern scenarios like these is strategy-proofness (SP), which requires that agents truthfully report their preferences.

Group strategy-proofness (GSP) requires that agents be truthful even when they can form groups and collude. While SP ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at the interim stage (before private information becomes public), GSP is a notion that is applied to the ex-post stage (after preferences have been revealed publicly). Thus, we propose a new notion of group strategy-proofness, coined robust group strategy-proofness (RGSP), which ensures that no colluding group can benefit by deviating from truth-telling at the interim stage.

First, we show that the Vickrey rule is RGSP in auction environments with a single, indivisible good. In the so-called housing allocation problem, the celebrated top trading cycles and deferred acceptance rules are RGSP when priorities satisfyan acyclicity condition, which differs from the acyclicity condition of Ergin (2002). For the allocation of a divisible, finite resource among agents with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991), we find that the uniform rule is not RGSP in general. We propose an amendment to the uniform rule that satisfies free disposal and is RGSP. More generally it is demonstrated that only free disposal, fixed path rules are RGSP within the class of sequential allotment rules.

 


Предстоящие и прошедшие семинары МИЭФ