Научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ, Sergey Tsyplakov (Darla Moore School of Business)

Во вторник, 23 января в 16.40 в ауд. 3402 (ул. Шаболовка, 26) прошел научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ по финансам. 
Докладчик: Sergey Tsyplakov (Darla Moore School of Business)
Тема доклада: "Bank Bailouts, Bail-ins, or Bankruptcy? A Dynamic Model and Empirical Tests of Optimal Regulatory Design" совместно с Allen N. Berger, Charles P. Himmelberg и Raluca A. Roman.

Тезисы доклада:  We present a dynamic model of optimal regulatory design of three regimes that deal with distress of large, complex banking organizations. These regimes are 1) bailout, as under TARP; 2) bail-in, as under the Orderly Liquidation Authority; and 3) traditional bankruptcy, as under the CHOICE Act. Model results suggest that only the bail-in tailored to individual banks provides incentives for banks to rebuild capital preemptively during financial distress. Empirical tests of changes in capital ratios and speeds of adjustment in response to the shift from the pre-crisis bailout regime to the post-crisis bail-in regime corroborate the predictions of the model.

---

Предстоящие и прошедшие семинары МИЭФ