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заместитель директора по академическим вопросам Замков Олег Олегович
Заместитель директора по по науке Никитин Максим Игоревич

Научный семинар МИЭФ, Dan Kovenock (Chapman University)

В среду, 17 мая в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка, 26) прошел научный семинар МИЭФ. 
Докладчик: Dan Kovenock (Chapman University)
Тема доклада: "All-Pay Auctions with Ties" совместно с Alan Gelder и Brian Roberson


Тезисы доклада: We study the symmetric, two-player, complete information all-pay auction in which a tie ensues if neither player outbids the other by more than a given amount. In the event of a tie, each player receives an identical fraction of the winning prize. Thus players engage in competition over two margins: losing versus tying, and tying versus winning. Two pertinent parameters are the margin required for victory, and the value of tying relative to winning. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria for the entire parameter space. For much of the parameter space, there is a unique Nash equilibrium which is also symmetric. Equilibria typically involve randomizing over multiple disjoint intervals, so that in essence players randomize between attempting to tie and attempting to win. In equilibrium, expected bids and payoffs are non-monotonic in both the margin required for victory and the relative value of tying.

 


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