Научный семинар МИЭФ, Inés Moreno de Barreda (University of Oxford)
Докладчик: Inés Moreno de Barreda (University of Oxford)
Тема доклада: "Persuasion with Correlation Neglect" совместно с Gilat Levy и Ronny Razin
Тезисы доклада: We consider a persuasion problem when the receiver has correlation neglect, that is, he is not aware that the signals he obtains arise from a joint distribution function with potential correlation. We show how a strategic sender who is aware of the correlation neglect of the receiver will indeed design joint information structures with correlation. Specifically, the sender will in general negatively correlate good news and positively correlate bad news across these signals. We also show that when the sender also chooses the marginal distributions (which are known to the receiver), he will design marginal information structures which are informative but not too much. Finally we show that if the receiver is not necessarily paying full attention to all signals, the sender will reduce the number of available signals, while otherwise the sender would prefer to have as many signals as possible in his disposal.