International College of Economics and Finance

ICEF Research Seminar by Inés Moreno de Barreda (University of Oxford)

On Thursday, March 23 at 4.40 pm, room 3211 (Shabolovka str. 26) ICEF held the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Inés Moreno de Barreda (University of Oxford)
Theme: "Heterogeneity in Corporate Investment and Financing Policies" joint with Theodosios Dimopoulos


Abstract: We consider a persuasion problem when the receiver has correlation neglect, that is, he is not aware that the signals he obtains arise from a joint distribution function with potential correlation. We show how a strategic sender who is aware of the correlation neglect of the receiver will indeed design joint information structures with correlation. Specifically, the sender will in general negatively correlate good news and positively correlate bad news across these signals. We also show that when the sender also chooses the marginal distributions (which are known to the receiver), he will design marginal information structures which are informative but not too much. Finally we show that if the receiver is not necessarily paying full attention to all signals, the sender will reduce the number of available signals, while otherwise the sender would prefer to have as many signals as possible in his disposal.

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