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Руководство
заместитель директора по академическим вопросам Замков Олег Олегович
Заместитель директора по по науке Никитин Максим Игоревич

Job Market семинар, Michele Valsecchi (University of Gothenburg)

В пятницу, 3 февраля в 10.30 прошел Job Market семинар МИЭФ и ФЭН. 
Докладчик: Michele Valsecchi (University of Gothenburg)
Тема доклада: "Corrupt Bureaucrats: The Response of Non-Elected Officials to Electoral Accountability"

В пятницу, 3 февраля в 10.30 прошел Job Market семинар Международного института экономики и финансов и Факультета экономических наук.
Докладчик: Michele Valsecchi (University of Gothenburg)
Тема доклада: "Corrupt Bureaucrats: The Response of Non-Elected Officials to Electoral Accountability"

Тезисы доклада: Modern state bureaucracies are designed to be insulated from political interference. Successful insulation implies that politicians' electoral incentives do not affect bureaucrats' corruption. I test this prediction by assembling a unique dataset on corruption, promotions and demotions for more than 4 million Indonesian local civil servants. To identify the effect of reelection incentives,  I exploit the existence of term limits and a difference-in-difference strategy.  I find that reelection incentives decrease the corruption behaviour of both top and administrative bureaucrats, which constitutes new evidence of the deep, far-reaching effects of politicians' accountability on local civil servants.  I explore a mechanism where bureaucrats have career concerns and politicians facing reelection manipulate such concerns by increasing the turnover of top bureaucrats.  Consistent with this mechanism, I find that reelection incentives increase demotions of top bureaucrats and promotions of administrative bureaucrats.


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