Job Market Seminar by Michele Valsecchi (University of Gothenburg)

On Friday, February 3 at 10.30 am, ICEF and FES held the Job Market Seminar.
Speaker: Michele Valsecchi (University of Gothenburg)
Theme: "Corrupt Bureaucrats: The Response of Non-Elected Officials to Electoral Accountability"

On Thursday,  February 3 at 10.30 am, International College of Economics and Finance and Faculty of Economic Sciences held the Job Market Seminar.
Speaker: Michele Valsecchi (University of Gothenburg)
Theme: "Corrupt Bureaucrats: The Response of Non-Elected Officials to Electoral Accountability"

Abstract: Modern state bureaucracies are designed to be insulated from political interference. Successful insulation implies that politicians' electoral incentives do not affect bureaucrats' corruption. I test this prediction by assembling a unique dataset on corruption, promotions and demotions for  more  than 4 million Indonesian local civil servants. To identify the effect of reelection incentives, I exploit the existence of term limits and a difference-in-difference strategy. I find that reelection incentives decrease the corruption behaviour of both top and administrative bureaucrats, which constitutes new evidence of the deep, far-reaching effects of politicians' accountability on local civil servants. I explore a mechanism where bureaucrats have career concerns and politicians facing reelection manipulate such concerns by increasing the turnover of top bureaucrats. Consistent with this mechanism, I find that reelection incentives increase demotions of top bureaucrats and promotions of administrative bureaucrats.

---

Forthcoming seminars
Past seminar