Научный семинар МИЭФ, Алексей Кушнир (Carnegie Mellon University)

В четверг, 17 декабря в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка 26, корпус 3) пройдет научный семинар Международного института экономики и финансов.
Докладчик: Алексей Кушнир (Carnegie Mellon University)
Тема доклада: "A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design"

Тезисы доклада: We apply basic techniques from convex analysis to develop a simple and unified treatment of optimal mechanism design. Our approach clarities the literature on reduced form implementation and generalizes it to social choice environments. We incorporate incentive compatibility using well-known results from majorization theory and prove equivalence of Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation. We derive the optimal mechanism for any social choice problem and any linear objective of agent values using standard micro-economic tools such as Hotelling's lemma. Finally, we extend our results to concave objectives of agent values and payments by providing a fixed-point equation characterizing the optimal mechanism.

 

---

Предстоящие семинары МИЭФ

Прошедшие семинары МИЭФ