Научный семинар МИЭФ, Сергей Северинов (Университет Британской Колумбии)
Докладчик: Сергей Северинов (Университет Британской Колумбии)
Тема доклада: "Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission" совместно с Rossella Argenziano and Francesco Squintani
Тезисы доклада:This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication model. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert’s advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decision maker, even if the expert is not more efficient than the decision maker at acquiring information. This result bears important implications for organization design. Communication by an expert to a decision maker may often outperform delegation of the decision making authority to the expert, as well as centralization by the decision maker of both information acquisition and decision making authority.
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