We use cookies in order to improve the quality and usability of the HSE website. More information about the use of cookies is available here, and the regulations on processing personal data can be found here. By continuing to use the site, you hereby confirm that you have been informed of the use of cookies by the HSE website and agree with our rules for processing personal data. You may disable cookies in your browser settings.

International College of Economics and Finance

ICEF/FES Joint Research Seminar by Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

On Thursday, November 21 ICEF and FES held the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Theme: "Exchange Design and Efficiency"

Abstract: In many markets, traders’ demands for an asset are contingent on the price of that asset alone rather than on the price of all assets they trade. We present a model based on the uniform-price double auction which accommodates arbitrary restrictions on cross-asset conditioning, including asset-by-asset market clearing (demand for each asset is conditioned on the price of that asset) and a single market clearing (demand for each asset is conditioned on the prices of all assets). If suitably designed, markets with limited demand conditioning are at least as efficient as a single market clearing for all traders and assets.  


ICEF seminars


 

Have you spotted a typo?
Highlight it, click Ctrl+Enter and send us a message. Thank you for your help!