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International College of Economics and Finance

ICEF Research Seminar by Kiryl Khalmetski (University of Cologne)

On Thursday, Aprill 11 ICEF held the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Kiryl Khalmetski (University of Cologne)
Theme: "Disliking to Disagree" joint with Florian Ho¤mann and Mark T. Le Quement

Abstract: Abundant empirical evidence suggests that people tend to dislike open disagreement. We propose a formalization of perceived disagreement and study implications of perceived disagreement aversion in disclosure games involving agents with different priors. Across a variety of settings, the ideal conditions for disclosure involve identical prior variances, while similar prior means may be detrimental for information transmission. When equilibrium disclosure is partial, it is biased towards evidence that is congruent with the most confident agent's prior bias. Perceived disagreement aversion leads to assortative matching in prior beliefs and confirmatory bias in disclosure that provides a theoretical basis for echo chambers.

 


ICEF seminars


 

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