ICEF/LFE Research Seminar in Finance, Andrey Malenko (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Speaker: Andrey Malenko (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Theme: «Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment»
On Tuesday, June 24 at 4.40 pm International College of Economics and Finance and International Laboratory of Financial Economics held the Research Seminar in Finance.
Speaker: Andrey Malenko (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Theme: «Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment»
Venue: Shabolovka st., 26, room 3209
Abstract: We consider a problem in which an uninformed principal repeatedly solicits advice from an informed but biased agent on whether to exercise an option. This problem is common in firms: Examples include headquarters deciding when to shut down an underperforming division or when to launch a new product. First, we show that equilibria can be quite different from those in the static .cheap talk. setting. Importantly, there is asymmetry in the direction of the agent’s bias. When the agent favors procrastination, there is full revelation of information but with delay. In contrast, when the agent is impatient, there is partial revelation of information, while exercise is either unbiased or delayed. Given the same absolute bias, the principal is better o¤ with a procrastinating agent. Next, we consider delegation as an alternative to communication. If the agent favors procrastination, delegation is always weakly inferior. In contrast, if the agent favors earlier exercise, delegation is optimal if the bias is low.