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Научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ

23 мая в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка д. 26) пройдет научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ
Докладчик: Томас Ное (Saïd Business School - Oxford University)


23 мая 
в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка д. 26, корпус 3) прошел совместный научный семинар Международного института экономики и финансов и Международной лаборатории финансовой экономики по финансам.
Докладчик: Томас Ное (Saïd Business School - Oxford University)
Тема доклада: «Blood and Money: Kin altruism, governance, and inheritance in the family firm»

Тезисы доклада: This paper develops a theory of governance and inheritance within family firms based on kin altruism (Hamilton, 1964). Family members weigh the payoffs to relatives in proportion to their relatives’ degree of relatedness. The theory shows that family management entails both costs and benefits. For any fixed contractual division of value between family owners and managers, the attenuated monitoring incentives associated with kin altruism produce a “policing problem” within family firms. This policing problem results in both increased managerial diversion and increased monitoring costs. Relatedness has conflicting effects on manager–owner compensation negotiations. On the one hand, owners are more willing to concede rents to managers to increase total value. On the other hand, because family managers internalize the costs to the family from their rejection of owner demands, relatedness also lowers managers’ reservation compensation level. If it is optimal for owners to exploit these reduced reservation level, lower formal compensation leads to more diversion and costly monitoring. Founders of firms, when deciding on their final bequests, anticipate these costs and benefits of family control. Unless the family’s pedigree is very unusual, founders’ preferences are more closely aligned with total value maximization than their descendants’. Founder bequests, though biased towards closer relatives, frequently involve divided bequests designed to curtail close relatives’ gains when such gains come at the expense of total family value.


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