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заместитель директора по академическим вопросам Замков Олег Олегович
Заместитель директора по по науке Никитин Максим Игоревич

Совместный научный семинар МИЭФ и ФЭН по политэкономии

Во вторник, 28 июня в 17:30 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка 26, корпус 3) прошел совместный научный семинар Международного института экономики и финансов и Факультета экономических наук по политэкономии.

Докладчик:
 Jeroen van de Ven (Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam School of Economics, University of Amsterdam)
Тема доклада: «Once a Cheater Always a Cheater? An Experimental Study on the Persistence of Lying»
Тезисы доклада: We study if lying behavior is persistent. In an experimental market, sellers are given private information about the quality of the product that they are selling. In chat or face-to-face interactions, sellers can try to convince buyers that their product is of high quality. We manipulate the incentives for sellers to lie. In the high-stakes condition, sellers receive large benefits if they can convince the buyer that their product is of high quality, while in the low-stakes condition sellers only receive small benefits for convincing the buyer that the quality is high. Every seller is exposed to both conditions, but we reverse the order among different sellers to test for path-dependency in behavior.

Докладчик: Marie Claire Villeval (CNRS – University of Lyon) 
Тема доклада: «Can transparency of information reduce embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania» with Salvatore Di Falco, Brice Magdalou, David Masclet, Marc Willinger
Тезисы доклада: Embezzlement is a major concern. By means of a sequential dictator game, we investigate theoretically and experimentally whether making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement. Consistent with reference-dependent preferences in terms of moral ideal, we show that the impact of transparency is conditional on the length of the transfer chain and on the position of the intermediary in the chain. Its direct effect on image encourages honesty. Its indirect effect via expectations plays in the opposite direction, motivating intermediaries to embezzle more when expecting that the following intermediary will embezzle less.


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