Совместный научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ, Maria Goltsman (University of Western Ontario)

В четверг, 28 апреля в 16.40 в ауд. 3211 (ул. Шаболовка, 26) прошел совместный научный семинар МИЭФ и ЛФЭ по финансам. 
Докладчик: Maria Goltsman (University of Western Ontario)
Тема доклада: "On the Optimality of Diverse Expert Panels in Persuasion Games" совместно с Sourav Bhattacharya и Arijit Mukherjee

Тезисы доклада: We consider a persuasion game where the decision-maker relies on a panel of biased experts. An expert's preference is parameterized by his ideal action, or agenda. Common intuition suggests that more information is revealed if the panel includes experts with opposed agendas, because such experts will undo each other’s attempts to conceal unfavorable information. In contrast, we show that recruiting experts with diverse agendas is optimal only if the correlation between the experts' signals is above a threshold. Moreover, if the experts' signals are independent conditional on the true state of nature, under mild assumptions it is optimal to recruit experts who have extreme but identical agendas. These findings suggest that the diversity of preferences must be considered in conjunction with the diversity of information sources, and it is generally sub-optimal to seek diversity in both dimensions.

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