Research Seminar
Speaker: Michael Alexeev (Indiana University)
Speaker: Michael Alexeev (Indiana University)
Theme: «Social Network Structure and Status Competition» joint work with Yao-Yu Chih
Venue: Shabolovka st., 26, room 3211
Abstract: In status competition studies, the utility of heterogeneous individuals typically depends on an economy-wide average indicator of status. In our model, emulative and jealous agents are embedded in an exogenous network where agent-specific reference group is determined by the direct link emanating from the agent. We show that individual consumption is proportional to the agent's “outbound” Katz-Bonacich network centrality measure and equilibrium is in general inefficient. The negative externality associated with each agent depends on her “inbound” centrality measure that we call the conspicuousness index. A tax based on this index combined with a uniform lump-sum transfer can attain efficiency.