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International College of Economics and Finance

ICEF/FES Job Market Seminar by Vitalijs Jascisens (TSE)

On Thursday, January 25 at 12.10, room 3211 (Shabolovka str. 26) ICEF and FES held Job Market Seminar.
Speaker: Vitalijs Jascisens (TSE)
Theme: "Can Entry Mitigate the Effect of Inflated Reserve Prices in Public Procurement"

Abstract: We present a dynamic model of optimal regulatory design of three regimes that deal with distress of large, complex banking organizations. These regimes are 1) bailout, as under TARP; 2) bail-in, as under the Orderly Liquidation Authority; and 3) traditional bankruptcy, as under the CHOICE Act. Model results suggest that only the bail-in tailored to individual banks provides incentives for banks to rebuild capital preemptively during financial distress. Empirical tests of changes in capital ratios and speeds of adjustment in response to the shift from the pre-crisis bailout regime to the post-crisis bail-in regime corroborate the predictions of the model.


Forthcoming and past seminars


 

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