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Regular version of the site

Research Seminar by Sergei Izmalkov (NES): «Shill bidding and optimal auctions»

Sergei IzmalkovThursday, November 05 International College of Economics and Finance held the regular Research seminar.
Presenter:
Sergei Izmalkov (NES)

Topic: «Shill bidding and optimal auctions» (pdf)

 

.Abstract: A single object is for sale to N asymmetric buyers in the independent private values setting by means of an English auction. We consider implications of seller's active participation in the bidding process, or shill bidding. The main result is that there exists an equilibrium of the English auction with shill bidding that is outcome equivalent to the optimal mechanism of Myerson (1981). We also show that common knowledge requirements for existence of the optimal equilibrium can be significantly reduced.

Venue: Pokrovski Bulvar, 11, Room Zh-822 


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