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Research at ICEF

ICEF faculty conduct research that is published in internationally leading peer-reviewed journals. They regularly participate in major international conferences in Economics and Finance. The ICEF International Laboratory of Financial Economics organizes annual conferences and workshops in Economics and Finance, attracting leading researchers from around the world to participate. ICEF conducts a regular research seminar series inviting world-renown academics to present their latest research.

ICEF People

Alexei Boulatov, PhD Finance, Tenured Professor

ICEF People

Sofya Budanova, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Vincent Fardeau, PhD Finance, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Markus Gebauer, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Runjie Geng, PhD Banking and Finance, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Dmitry Makarov, PhD Finance, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Tatiana Mayskaya, PhD Social Science, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Maxim Nikitin, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Fabian Slonimczyk, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Vladimir Sokolov, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Sergey Stepanov, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Alexander Usvitskiy, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Anna Yurko, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Kirill Bukin, PhD, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Grigory Kantorovich, PhD, Tenured Professor, Distinguished Professor

ICEF People

Olga Kuzina, PhD Sociology, Professor

ICEF People

Anatoly Peresetsky, PhD, Tenured Professor

ICEF People

Alla Fridman, PhD, Tenured Professor

ICEF Alumni

Natalia Gimpelson, student at University of Rochester, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Аrtem Gudov, Head of Investment Department, M.Video

ICEF Alumni

Martsella Davitaya, student at Columbia University, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Danil Dmitriev, student at University of California, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Anastasia Erastova, студентка NYU Courant Institute, MSc in Mathematics

ICEF Alumni

Valeriya Erokhina, student at EDHEC, MSc in Financial Markets

ICEF Alumni

Ilya Ilyin, student at Boston University, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Sergey Kozlov, Operations Director, LEGO

ICEF Alumni

Filipp Kolchin, senior consultant, Bain & Compan

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Kolchina, Deputy CEO, Papa John's Russia

ICEF Alumni

Kirill Kondrashin, Executive Director, DCM, J.P. Morgan

ICEF Alumni

Sergey Kurdyukov, vice-president, Citigroup

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Lopareva, analyst, Unicredit bank

ICEF Alumni

Viktoriia Petrova, Investment Banking Analyst (FIG), Deutsche Bank

ICEF Alumni

Olga Ponomarenko, Quantitative analyst, Barclays

ICEF Alumni

Maria Chaderina, Assistant Professor, Vienna University of Economics and Business

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Chegaeva, student at Princeton University, Master in Finance

Research Seminar by Andrei Barbos (University of South Florida)

Event ended

On Thursday, May 12 at 4.40 pm, room 3211 (Shabolovka str. 26) ICEF will hold the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Andrei Barbos (University of South Florida)
Theme: "Optimal Contracts with Random Monitoring"

On Thursday, May 12 at 4.40 pm International College of Economics and Finance will hold the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Andrei Barbos (University of South Florida)
Theme: "Optimal Contracts with Random Monitoring"
Venue: Shabolovka st., 26, room 34211

Abstract: We study an optimal contract problem under moral hazard in a principal-agent framework where contracts are implemented through random monitoring. This is a monitoring instrument which reveals the precise action taken by the agent with some nondegenerate probability, and otherwise reveals no information. The agent’s cost of performing the action depends on a random state of nature. This state is private information to the agent, but he can non-verifiably communicate it, allowing the contract to specify wages as a function of the agent’s message. We show that the optimal contract partitions the set of types in three regions. The most efficient types exert effort and receive a reward when audited. Moderately efficient types exert effort but are paid the same wage with an audit as without. The least efficient types do not exert effort. More intense monitoring increases the value of a contract when the agent is risk averse.

Pass can be ordered by:
Phone: (495)772-95-90*26090
e-mail: vzheleznov@hse.ru
contact: Zheleznov Slava

Forthcoming seminars

Past seminar

Date

May 12, 2016 16:40

Topics

Research

Address

3211

About

International College of Economics and Finance