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Regular version of the site

Research Seminar by Alexei Parakhonyak (University of Oxford)

Event ended
On Tuesday, April 5 at 4.40 pm, room 3211  (Shabolovka str. 26) ICEF will hold the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Alexei Parakhonyak (University of Oxford)
Theme: "Optimal Sales Schemes for Network Goods" совместно с Nick Vikander

On Tuesday, April 5 at 4.40 pm International College of Economics and Finance will hold the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Alexei Parakhonyak (University of Oxford)
Theme: "Optimal Sales Schemes for Network Goods" совместно с Nick Vikander
Venue: Shabolovka st., 26, room 3211

Abstract: This paper explores how to best sequence sales in the presence of network effects. A monopolist sets a price for its product and also chooses whether to serve some consumers before others through its choice of sales scheme. We show that a firm with imperfect control over sequencing should serve consumers as sequentially as possible, with consumers in smaller groups served first, and that the optimal sales scheme is fully sequential. Under a fully sequential scheme, each consumer observes previous sales before choosing whether to buy himself, and independent-minded consumers can act as opinion leaders for those who follow.


Pass can be ordered by:
Phone: (495)772-95-90*26090
e-mail: vzheleznov@hse.ru
contact: Zheleznov Slava 


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