Научный семинар Елены Пановой (Академия народного хозяйства): «A Passion for Democracy»
Во вторник, 6 декабря в 16.40 в ауд. Ж-822 (Покровский бульвар, 11) прошел совместный научный семинар МИЭФ и семинар по Политической экономике.
Докладчик: Елена Панова (Академия народного хозяйства)
Тема доклада: «A Passion for Democracy»
Тезисы доклада: Classic theories of the vote assume that voting choices are dictated by rational preferences over policy alternatives. They justify positive turnout despite small pivot probabilities by a warm glow from the very act of voting. This approach does not allow to model "irrational" behaviors, such as: habitual voting, conformity with a majority, voter ignorance. We propose a dynamic model of a majority vote with asymmetric information accommodating these behaviors. Our approach allows us to analyze the effect of public information on the vote, which is relevant. We find that public information biased in favour of one alternative has a non-positive effect on information aggregation.