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Oleg O. Zamkov
We consider a game in extensive form recurrently played by agents who are randomly drawn from large populations and matched. We assume that preferences over actions at any information set admit a smooth-ambiguity representation in the sense of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (Econometrica, 2005), which may induce dynamic inconsistencies. We take this into account in our analysis of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) given players' feedback about the path of play. Battigalli, Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (Amer. Econ. Rev., 2015) show that the set of SCE's of a simultaneous-move game with feedback expands as ambiguity aversion increases. We show by example that SCE in a sequential game is not equivalent to SCE applied to the strategic form of such game, and that the previous monotonicity result does not extend to general sequential games. Still, we provide sufficient conditions under which the monotonicity result holds for SCE.
The purpose of this book is to develop academic skills of writing an extended essay. The process of developing this skill consists of six steps: title analysis, writing an introduction, main part paragraph development and writing a conclusion. Two lessons are devoted to writing an abstract and a summary. The last step is compiling bibliography. During this course attention is given to ways of avoiding plagiarism and punctuation issues.
The book contains Appendix with sample essays written by ICEF and School of Design students (National Research University Higher School of Economics). It is meant for classroom work but can be used for self-study, too.
This paper investigates on a theoretical level the underlying causes of recent trends in decision of firms to hire temporary and permanent labour when workers and firms meet through a frictional directed search technology. Temporary workers differ from permanent workers in that they have a lower bargaining weight but look for a permanent job while on the temporary job. The findings are that permanent arrangements are more prevalent the more productive the aggregate production function is, i.e. also in the less productive phases. More efficient matching has an inverse U shaped impact, it first increases the prevalence of temporary arrangements and then decreases it. Bargaining weights have an ambiguous impact.
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents will play. If these theories are commonly known, players will refine their first-order beliefs and challenge their own theories through strategic reasoning. I propose a new solution concept, Selective Rationalizability, which captures the following hypothesis: when the observed behavior is not compatible with the beliefs in rationality and in the theories of all orders, players keep the beliefs in rationality that are compatible with the observed behavior, and drop the incompatible beliefs in the theories. Thus, Selective Rationalizability captures Common Strong Belief in Rationality (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) and refines Extensive-Form Rationalizability (Pearce, 1984, Battigalli, 1996), whereas Strong-Δ-Rationalizability (Battigalli, 2003, Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) captures the opposite epistemic priority choice. Selective Rationalizability is extended to encompass richer epistemic priority orderings among different theories of opponents' behavior. This allows to shed some new light on strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986).
The manual was compiled in accordance with the Program of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, designed for students under the Master's program.
The manual contains a set of teaching materials with basic concepts, sample tasks, tests, practical situations for conducting seminars, as well as for independent work of students.
For students, graduate students and teachers of economic universities and faculties, all interested in topical issues of institutional science.
The monograph is written based on materials held in September 2017. at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation of the conference dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the publication of the first volume of Capital by Karl Marx. The monograph analyzes the methodology of Capital, its place in the history of economic thought and current issues through the prism of time. Particular attention is paid to the development of the ideas of "Capital" in the postmodern era. Special sections are devoted to the spread of Marxist ideas in Russia and the problems of modernizing Russia in the light of the ideas of Capital.
For students, graduate students and teachers of economic universities and faculties, all interested in current issues of modern economics.
The textbook in 2 parts The textbook contains a course of macroeconomic theory of introductory and intermediate levels and includes a standard set of topics studied in the baccalaureate of economic universities. In an understandable way it expounds the fundamentals of macroeconomic theory and macroeconomic policy: presents the definitions of the basic concepts and terms; outlines the key formulas; provides the thorough explanation and interpretation of macroeconomic relations and of the mechanisms of macroeconomic processes. The textbook gives the comprehensive analysis of the most important macroeconomic models, including dynamic ones, which apparatus is provided in the form accessible to readers with different levels of mathematical background. The analysis of various options for macroeconomic policy includes a detailed intuitive description of the mechanisms and consequences of each policy in the closed and in the open economies, and for different time periods: short-run, medium-run and long-run. For clarity and visibility, the theoretical statements are illustrated by logical chains, diagrams, tables, numerous graphs and statistical data, most of which relate to the Russian economy. The theory is accompanied by numerical problems with solutions, explanations and comments that not only gives insight of what formulas and how are to be used for solving typical tasks, but also contributes to deeper understanding of the theoretical material.
The textbook consists of two parts. Part I includes eight chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 have an overview character; they provide an idea about the subject and the methods of macroeconomic analysis and the key macroeconomic variables. Chapters 3–8 are devoted to the theory of aggregate demand; they deal with the models of the goods and money markets and describe the consequences of macroeconomic policy in the closed economy in the short run.
Part II included nine chapters. Chapter 9 addresses the labor market in order to derive aggregate supply. Chapter 10 describes the model of aggregate demand and aggregate supply and analyzes the consequences of exogenous shocks in the short run and in the medium run. Chapters 11–13 focus on the problems of macroeconomic instability — unemployment and inflation. Chapter 14 considers the factors and models of the long-run economic growth. Chapters 15–17 contain the theory of the open economy and examine the implications of the stabilization policies in the open economy.
This book is intended for undergraduate students of economic faculties; students of non-economic specialties, studying macroeconomics; macroeconomic theory teachers; applicants of master's programs of economic universities; attendees of professional retraining courses and further training faculties, as well as for all who are interested in macroeconomic theory and macroeconomic policy.
This monograph is devoted to the institutional analysis of informal employment in the modern world. The development of views on the institute of informal employment is considered, global trends in the development of the shadow economy at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries are shown.
The advantage of the monograph is a detailed analysis of Russian practice. The author studies the sources of informal employment in modern Russia, reveals the content and main forms, as well as development prospects in our country. The authors show that the reduction in transaction costs is the main direction of reducing informal employment in Russia. In the design of the book used photos of the authors.
Designed for teachers of economic universities and faculties, graduate students and undergraduates, as well as all interested in topical issues of modern economics.
This paper studies the organisational structure of contracting out transportation operations to a vertical partnership between local authorities and a vertically integrated monopoly. Pricing decisions are delegated to the partnership operating in the downstream market as a socially concerned firm that maximises a weighted sum of social welfare and profits. The price for essential input required to produce each unit of the transportation service is determined by the monopoly in the upstream market for rolling stock and crew leasing. A forward ownership interest in the vertical partnership held by the monopoly yields a partial rebate of the downstream margin. In turn, the local authorities can extract the upstream monopoly rent via a franchise fee which can be determined ex post. Our theoretical model predicts that local authorities with a relatively high share in the partnership should decrease the net transfer from the budget by increasing the franchise fees if the upstream profit margins are high. The empirical evidence for the impact of the ownership structure on contractual regime is found in the panel data for 25 suburban passenger companies in Russia in 2011-2015, where partial cost recovery and inappropriate compensation plays the role of pseudo-franchising contracts
We investigate the consequences of excessive international debt overhang as they relate to both debtor and creditor countries. In particular, we assess the impact of monetary policy on financial stability and how it can be used to smooth borrowers, as well as creditors, consumption over the business cycle. Based on [Goodhart, Peiris, Tsomocos, 2018], we establish that an independent countercyclical monetary policy, that contracts liquidity whenever debt grows whereas it expands it when default rises, reduces volatility of consumption. In effect, monetary policy provides an extra degree of freedom to the policymaker. We implement our approach to the Czech and Eurozone area economies during the 1990s.
In our model, we introduce endogenous default ά la [Shubik, Wilson, 1977], whereby debtors incur a welfare cost in renegotiating their contractual debt obligations that is commensurate to the level of default. However, this cost depends explicitly on the business cycle and it should be countercyclical. Hence, contractionary monetary policy reduces the volume of trade and efficiency, thus increasing default. This occurs as the default cost increases the associated default accelerator channel engenders higher default rates. On the other hand, lower interest rates increase trade efficiency and, consequently, reduce the amplitude of the business cycle and benefit financial stability.
In sum, the appropriate design of monetary policy complements financial stability policy. The modeling of endogenous default allows us to study the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policy.
Most discussions of the Greek debt overhang have focussed on the implications for Greece. We show that when additional funds released to the debtor (Greece), via debt restructuring, are used efficiently in pursuit of a practicable business plan, then both debtor and creditor can benefit. We examine a dynamic two country model calibrated to Greek and German economies and support two-steady states, one with endogenous default and one without, depending on creditors expectations. In the default steady state, debt forgiveness lowers the volatility of both German and Greek consumption whereas demanding higher recovery rates has the opposite effect.
This study is focused on gaps in the theory of capital structure research regarding the
phenomenon of zero-debt behavior. On the sample of firms from 21 countries with emerging
capital markets over the period of 2010–2015, we show that the zero-debt policy choice
is firstly driven by financial flexibility motive, while financial constraints could be regarded
as the second motive. We show that major determinants of the zero-leverage choice are
growth opportunities, profitability, business risk and cash holdings. We find that all these
firms are smaller, less profitable, riskier and possess high cash holdings. Moreover, we find
that macroeconomic conditions have lower influence on the debt policy decision in comparison
with corporate determinants.
Financial constraints reduce the lawyer's ability to file lawsuits and bring cases to trial. As a result, access to justice for victims, pretrial bargaining, and potential injurers' precaution might be affected. We study civil litigation using a model that allows for asymmetric information, financially-constrained lawyers, third-party lawyer lending, and a continuum of plaintiff's types. We contribute to the economic analysis of law by generalizing seminal models of litigation (Bebchuk, 1984, Bebchuk, 1988; Katz, 1990), offering the first formal definition of access to justice, and presenting comprehensive social welfare analysis of relevant public policy. We provide complete equilibrium characterization and identify necessary conditions for the existence of the mixed- and pure-strategy PBE. Access to justice is denied to some victims under the mixed-strategy equilibrium. We then study the social welfare effects of policies aimed at relaxing lawyers' financial constraints, and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for a welfare-enhancing effect.
This paper is an extension of the recent work by the authors where a simplifying assumption of no costs of entry to the religious market was set. In the present paper, the religious market is regulated in the sense that a sect in order to establish itself in a market has to bear costs of entry. In the case of one official denomination the strict sect attracts less flock, and the monopoly church will acquire more church-goers and even marginally religious people will hesitate between joining the church and staying nonreligious. In case of prohibitively high costs the sect will shrink to zero and the church will take control over almost all population with the remaining small group of nonbelievers. A comparative statics problem in the case of the two official churches was also considered. In stage one of the game these churches choose their position in the strictness interval with the subsequent emergence of sects. The more costly is entry the less populated will be the strict sect and even the moderate sect will turn more liberal with the loss of some of its members.
Confidence and overconfidence are essential aspects of human nature, but measuring (over)confidence is not easy. Our approach is to consider students' forecasts of their exam grades. Part of a student's grade expectation is based on the student's previous academic achievements; what remains can be interpreted as (over)confidence. Our results are based on a sample of about five hundred second-year undergraduate students enrolled in a statistics course in Moscow. The course contains three exams and each student produces a forecast for each of the three exams. Our models allow us to estimate overconfidence quantitatively. Using these models we find that students' expectations are not rational and that most students are overconfident, in agreement with the general literature. Less obvious is that overconfidence helps: given the same academic achievement students with larger confidence obtain higher exam grades. Female students are less overconfident than male students, their forecasts are more rational, and they are also faster learners in the sense that they adjust their expectations more rapidly.
In the late 2000s, a number of analysts were optimistic about Brazil’s future. Their expectant analyses did not bear out, however, as a political and economic crisis developed just as Brazil was gearing up to host two mega-events, the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. This paper has two aims. The first is to deepen our understanding of the crisis through examining one of the foremost civil society actors to emerge in this period: the Landless Workers’ Movement (Movimento de Trabalhadores Sem-Teto, MTST). The second is to use this case to consider the potential for the sociology of critical capacity - a field of theory that emerged out of the Political and Moral Sociology Research Group in Paris in the 1980s - to contribute to theorising the ‘justification work’ of social movements.
“Default is to macro-economics what sin is to theology: regrettable but central and essential”. The contemporaneous assessment of both liquidity and default within a framework of missing financial markets, multiple currencies, heterogeneous economic actors (i.e., investors, firms and intermediaries) and multiple externalities is warranted for analysing the interplay of financial and price stability. Thus, the complementarity and substitutability of regulatory and monetary policies can be identified and dissected. The optimal policy mix may be subsequently determined given the objectives of the fiscal and monetary authorities.