Research seminar by Ruben Enikolopov (NES): “Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution: the Role of Career Concerns”
Thursday, April 23 ICEF held Research seminar.
Presenter: Ruben Enikolopov (NES)
Topic: “Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution: the Role of Career Concerns” (pdf)
Abstract: Stronger career concerns induce appointed bureaucrats to adopt different policies as compared with elected politicians. In particular, they are less likely to use targeted redistribution to achieve personal political goals. I use example of patronage jobs in local governments in the U.S. to provide empirical support for this claim. I show that the number of full-time public employees is significantly higher in local governments with elected chief executives and that this di¤erence increases during the election years. I show that the number of full-time public employees increases with the age of appointed chief executive, but there is no such relationship in the case of elected chief executives. This result is consistent with the notion that career careers are especially strong for young bureaucrats, which makes them least likely to be engaged in targeted redistribution. None of the results is significant for the number of part-time employees, since hiring part-time employees provides very few political benefits as compared with full-time employees.
Venue: Pokrovski Bulvar, 11, Room Zh-822