Серия онлайн семинаров по Микроэкономике с Qingmin Liu
В четверг, 3 июня со своими докладами выступят:
16:20 - 17:20 Эмилиано Катонини (МИЭФ, ВШЭ). Тема доклада: "Local Dominance" совместно с Jingyi Xue
17:20 - 18:20 Сергей Степанов (МИЭФ и ФЭН, ВШЭ). Тема доклада: TBA
18:40 - 19:40 Суасо Гарин Пейо (МИЭФ, ВШЭ) Тема доклада: "Heterogeneously Perceived Incentives in Dynamic Environments: Rationalization, Robustness and Unique Selections" совместно с Evan Piermont
19:40 - 20:40 Татьяна Майская (МИЭФ и ФЭН, ВШЭ). Тема доклада: "Privacy Paradox: When Does Hiding in Plain Sight Work?" совместно с Arina Nikandrova
21:00 - 22:00 Стивен Кивинен (МИЭФ, ВШЭ) Тема доклада: "Vote Swapping with Two Alternatives"
В пятницу, 4 июня со своим докладом "Strategic Exploration: Preemption and Prioritization" (совместно с Yu Fu Wong) выступит Qingmin Liu (Columbia University)
Тезисы доклада: This paper provides a model of strategic exploration in which two competing players simultaneously explore a set of alternatives over time to study search dynamics, payoff divisions, and distributions of discovery time. The strategic tension is between preemption, i.e., the incentive to covertly explore alternatives that the opponent will explore in future, and prioritization, i.e., the incentive to explore alternatives with the highest success probabilities. We show that players randomize over the same set of alternatives that expands over time, duplicating each other’s explorations from start to finish. When players are symmetric in their speed of exploration, equilibrium strategies are greedy. In the asymmetric case, the weak player’s strategy is greedy, but the strong player randomizes over alternatives with different posteriors and captures a share of payoff disproportionately larger than his share of exploration capacity. The weak player conducts extensive instead of intensive exploration, i.e., he covers as many alternatives as the strong player does but never explores any alternative with cumulative probability one. The overall discovery time decreases in asymmetry in the first-order stochastic dominance sense.