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Research at ICEF

ICEF faculty conduct research that is published in internationally leading peer-reviewed journals. They regularly participate in major international conferences in Economics and Finance. The ICEF International Laboratory of Financial Economics organizes annual conferences and workshops in Economics and Finance, attracting leading researchers from around the world to participate. ICEF conducts a regular research seminar series inviting world-renown academics to present their latest research.

ICEF People

Alexei Boulatov, PhD Finance, Tenured Professor

ICEF People

Sofya Budanova, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Vincent Fardeau, PhD Finance, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Markus Gebauer, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Runjie Geng, PhD Banking and Finance, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Dmitry Makarov, PhD Finance, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Tatiana Mayskaya, PhD Social Science, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Maxim Nikitin, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Fabian Slonimczyk, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Vladimir Sokolov, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Sergey Stepanov, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Alexander Usvitskiy, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Anna Yurko, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Kirill Bukin, PhD, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Grigory Kantorovich, PhD, Tenured Professor, Distinguished Professor

ICEF People

Olga Kuzina, PhD Sociology, Professor

ICEF People

Anatoly Peresetsky, PhD, Tenured Professor

ICEF People

Alla Fridman, PhD, Tenured Professor

ICEF Alumni

Natalia Gimpelson, student at University of Rochester, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Аrtem Gudov, Head of Investment Department, M.Video

ICEF Alumni

Martsella Davitaya, student at Columbia University, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Danil Dmitriev, student at University of California, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Anastasia Erastova, студентка NYU Courant Institute, MSc in Mathematics

ICEF Alumni

Valeriya Erokhina, student at EDHEC, MSc in Financial Markets

ICEF Alumni

Ilya Ilyin, student at Boston University, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Sergey Kozlov, Operations Director, LEGO

ICEF Alumni

Filipp Kolchin, senior consultant, Bain & Compan

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Kolchina, Deputy CEO, Papa John's Russia

ICEF Alumni

Kirill Kondrashin, Executive Director, DCM, J.P. Morgan

ICEF Alumni

Sergey Kurdyukov, vice-president, Citigroup

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Lopareva, analyst, Unicredit bank

ICEF Alumni

Viktoriia Petrova, Investment Banking Analyst (FIG), Deutsche Bank

ICEF Alumni

Olga Ponomarenko, Quantitative analyst, Barclays

ICEF Alumni

Maria Chaderina, Assistant Professor, Vienna University of Economics and Business

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Chegaeva, student at Princeton University, Master in Finance

ICEF/LFE Research Seminar in Finance, Andrey Malenko (MIT Sloan School of Management)

Event ended

On Tuesday, June 24 at 4.40 pm, room 3209 (Shabolovka str. 26) ICEF and LFE will hold the Research Seminar in Finance.
Speaker: Andrey Malenko (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Theme: «Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment»

On Tuesday, June 24 at 4.40 pm International College of Economics and Finance and International Laboratory of Financial Economics will hold the Research Seminar in Finance.

Speaker: Andrey Malenko (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Theme: «Timing Decisions in Organizations: Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment»
Venue: Shabolovka st., 26, room 3209

Abstract: We consider a problem in which an uninformed principal repeatedly solicits advice from an informed but biased agent on whether to exercise an option. This problem is common in firms: Examples include headquarters deciding when to shut down an underperforming division or when to launch a new product. First, we show that equilibria can be quite different from those in the static .cheap talk. setting. Importantly, there is asymmetry in the direction of the agent’s bias. When the agent favors procrastination, there is full revelation of information but with delay. In contrast, when the agent is impatient, there is partial revelation of information, while exercise is either unbiased or delayed. Given the same absolute bias, the principal is better o¤ with a procrastinating agent. Next, we consider delegation as an alternative to communication. If the agent favors procrastination, delegation is always weakly inferior. In contrast, if the agent favors earlier exercise, delegation is optimal if the bias is low.

Everyone interested is welcome to attend!

Pass can be ordered by:
tel. (495)772-95-90*26090
e-mail: vzheleznov@hse.ru
contact: Zheleznov Slava

Forthcoming seminars

Date

June 24, 2014 16:40

About

International College of Economics and Finance