Joint ICEF and Moscow Mathematical Research Seminar by Jörgen W. Weibull (SSE): "Robust set-valued solutions in games"

Monday, June 08 ICEF and Moscow Mathematical Research Seminar held a joint session on “Mathematical Methods of Decision Analysis in Economics, Business and Politics”
Presenter: Jörgen W. Weibull (Stockholm School of Economics)
Topic: "Robust set-valued solutions in games" (pdf)

 

Abstract: in his Ph. D thesis, John Nash took up two interpretations of his equilibrium concept: the "rationalistic" or epistemic interpretation, and the "mass action" or evolutionary interpretation, respectively. Do there exist solution concepts that have robustness properties in both interpretations? In the epistemic interpretation: robustness against small perturbations of beliefs and/or rationality. In the evolutionary interpretation: robustness against small perturbations of the population distribution. It will be argued that this requires that we move from point-valued to set-valued solution concepts.

 

Venue: Pokrovski Bulvar, 11, Room D-318

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