Research seminar by Julia Shvets (University of Cambrige): «Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures»

Thursday, April 14 at 4.30 pm International College of Economics and Finance held Research seminar.
Venue: Pokrovski Bulvar, 11, Room Zh-822
Speaker: Julia Shvets (University of Cambrige)
Theme: «Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures» (joint work with Toke Aidt) (pdf version)

Abstract:  We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less state funds to their district when they cannot run for re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this tendency is less pronounced in states with many legislative districts.

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