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Regular version of the site

Research at ICEF

ICEF faculty conduct research that is published in internationally leading peer-reviewed journals. They regularly participate in major international conferences in Economics and Finance. The ICEF International Laboratory of Financial Economics organizes annual conferences and workshops in Economics and Finance, attracting leading researchers from around the world to participate. ICEF conducts a regular research seminar series inviting world-renown academics to present their latest research.

ICEF People

Alexei Boulatov, PhD Finance, Tenured Professor

ICEF People

Sofya Budanova, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Vincent Fardeau, PhD Finance, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Markus Gebauer, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Runjie Geng, PhD Banking and Finance, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Dmitry Makarov, PhD Finance, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Tatiana Mayskaya, PhD Social Science, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Maxim Nikitin, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Fabian Slonimczyk, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Vladimir Sokolov, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Sergey Stepanov, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Alexander Usvitskiy, PhD Economics, Assistant Professor

ICEF People

Anna Yurko, PhD Economics, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Kirill Bukin, PhD, Associate Professor

ICEF People

Grigory Kantorovich, PhD, Tenured Professor, Distinguished Professor

ICEF People

Olga Kuzina, PhD Sociology, Professor

ICEF People

Anatoly Peresetsky, PhD, Tenured Professor

ICEF People

Alla Fridman, PhD, Tenured Professor

ICEF Alumni

Natalia Gimpelson, student at University of Rochester, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Аrtem Gudov, Head of Investment Department, M.Video

ICEF Alumni

Martsella Davitaya, student at Columbia University, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Danil Dmitriev, student at University of California, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Anastasia Erastova, студентка NYU Courant Institute, MSc in Mathematics

ICEF Alumni

Valeriya Erokhina, student at EDHEC, MSc in Financial Markets

ICEF Alumni

Ilya Ilyin, student at Boston University, PhD in Economics

ICEF Alumni

Sergey Kozlov, Operations Director, LEGO

ICEF Alumni

Filipp Kolchin, senior consultant, Bain & Compan

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Kolchina, Deputy CEO, Papa John's Russia

ICEF Alumni

Kirill Kondrashin, Executive Director, DCM, J.P. Morgan

ICEF Alumni

Sergey Kurdyukov, vice-president, Citigroup

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Lopareva, analyst, Unicredit bank

ICEF Alumni

Viktoriia Petrova, Investment Banking Analyst (FIG), Deutsche Bank

ICEF Alumni

Olga Ponomarenko, Quantitative analyst, Barclays

ICEF Alumni

Maria Chaderina, Assistant Professor, Vienna University of Economics and Business

ICEF Alumni

Ekaterina Chegaeva, student at Princeton University, Master in Finance

Research Seminar by Sidartha Gordon (Sciences Po)

Event ended

On Thursday, June 4 at 4.40 pm, room 3211 (Shabolovka st., 26) ICEF will hold the Research Seminar.
Speaker: Sidartha Gordon (Sciences Po)
Theme: "Information Choice and Diversity: The Role of Strategic Complementarities"

On Thursday, June 4 at 4.40 pm International College of Economics and Finance will hold a research seminar.
Speaker: Sidartha Gordon (Sciences Po)
Theme: "Information Choice and Diversity: The Role of Strategic Complementarities"
Venue: Shabolovka st., 26, room 3211

Abstract: We study a class of games where players face restrictions on how much information they can obtain on a common payoff relevant state, but have some leeway in covertly choosing the dependence between their signals, before simultaneously choosing actions. Using a new stochastic dependence ordering between signals, we show that each player chooses information that is more dependent on the information of other players whose actions are either isotonic and complements with his actions or antitonic and substitutes with his actions. Similarly, each player chooses information that is less dependent on the information of other players whose actions are antitonic and complements with his actions or isotonic and substitutes with his actions. We then provide sufficient conditions for information structures such as public or private information to arise in equilibrium. Equilibrium information structures may be inefficient. Making which signals were chosen (but not their realizations) publicly observable may restore efficiency.

Everyone interested is welcome to attend!

Pass can be ordered by:
tel. (495)772-95-90*26090
e-mail: vzheleznov@hse.ru
contact: Zheleznov Slava

Forthcoming seminars

Date

June 04, 2015 16:40

About

International College of Economics and Finance